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This study presents how financial benchmarks have become beacons for the 
world of economy and finance. Through the example of the Budapest Interbank 
Offered Rate (hereinafter: BUBOR), the study evaluates the practical applicability 
of the methods that may be used to prevent or detect attempts at manipulating 
interbank rates used as financial benchmarks. It points out that a payment system-
based financial benchmark model could contribute significantly to eliminating 
the manipulation risk associated with the fixing of benchmark rates. The author 
reviews the extent to which the given benchmark (BUBOR) is exposed to potential 
manipulation attempts in two different periods, each comprising 6 scenarios. He 
finds that a low interest rate environment and the low standard deviation of the 
fixing submissions combined with the methodology applied essentially reduced 
the manipulation potential to almost zero. This also means that in periods of less 
volatile fixing submissions it is justified and substantiated to reduce the resources 
spent on supervising and auditing the production process of benchmark rates. 
Introducing specific methods may prompt an adjustment on the part of the banks 
contributing to the fixing (panel banks), which may weaken or strengthen the 
efficiency of the method concerned. 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: B25, B26, C10, C52, D53, D69, G28
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1. Introduction
In Hungarian literature, interbank benchmark rates are often referred to as beacons 
for the financial community (MNB 2000; Erhart – Mátrai 2015; Horváth et al. 2017). 
This picturesque expression could not be more appropriate, as interbank rates 
exert an impact, whether directly or indirectly, on the price of numerous financial 
instruments. Accordingly, besides playing an important role in the implementation 
of monetary policy, they also carry key significance for market participants. 
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Owing to their special nature, we rightly view benchmark interbank rates as 
public goods (Horváth et al. 2017) nowadays. Setting these rates requires active 
participation on the part of market participants. Similar to Hardin’s (1968) concept, 
the tragedy of the commons phenomenon in relation to interbank reference rates 
arises from overuse. In this case, however, it is not the public good that loses its 
value (i.e. disappears) but the incentives to transform public good into private 
interest increase in number or change their nature. To put it simply, the greater the 
number of financial instruments whose pricing and value depend on the benchmark 
rates, the stronger the incentive to influence (manipulate) reference rates.
The LIBOR scandal erupting in 2008 around the London Interbank Offered Rate drew 
the supervisory authorities’ attention to the vulnerability of financial benchmarks. 
As a result, the regulatory wave unravelling in the wake of the financial crisis could 
not ignore the need to strengthen the integrity of rates used as benchmarks.
This study aims to show how interbank offered rates have become beacons for 
the world of economy and finance, and to evaluate, through the example of the 
Budapest Interbank Offered Rate (hereinafter: BUBOR), the practical applicability of 
the methods that may be used to curb or detect attempts at manipulating interbank 
benchmark rates. The article also aims to launch a debate on a payment system-
based model, which could, to a large degree, eliminate the manipulation risk arising 
with respect to the calculation of reference rates.
The first half of the study describes the evolution of interbank rates using LIBOR 
as an example. The second structural part describes the procedure developed for 
defining the manipulation potential of the interbank rate, and proposes a number 
of methods which may be applied to mitigate the manipulation potential or detect 
it once materialised. Subsequently, the practical applicability and efficiency of the 
methods discussed will be tested using BUBOR as an example. The paper ends with 
a summary of the author’s conclusions.
2. Financial benchmarks and the manipulation incentives
In order to understand the incentives to manipulate interbank rates, it is important 
to shed light on the circumstances that led to the development of interbank rates 
and to grasp the original purpose of these rates. This chapter puts this topic in 
a historical context.
2.1. The development of interbank reference rates
The years following the end of the Second World War saw substantial capital flows 
(around USD 12 billion) from the United States to (Western) European countries, 
primarily within the framework of the Marshall Plan (Tarján 2018), which paved the 
way for dynamic growth in the countries concerned. By the beginning of the 1960s, 
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excess liquidity had accumulated in the Western-European and North-American 
banking sectors, which enabled the banking industry to shift its focus to riskier 
foreign investments. In addition to the upswing in trade and the abundant liquidity 
mentioned above, the dynamic rise of dollar-based lending was another important 
indicator of the international capital flows. This lending, however, fell outside the 
scope of the regulatory regimes applied both in the United States and in Europe. 
Interest collection (in the form of non-interest-bearing deposits) was practically 
unrestricted, and capping interest rates on deposits did not apply in the Eurodollar 
market (Altunbas et al. 2006).
The emergence of the Eurodollar market combined with the relative price 
stability that characterised currencies under the Bretton Woods system (Borszéki 
2009) collectively provided fertile ground for international private investments. 
Internationalisation, however, also implied increased risk. Syndicated loans were 
created to mitigate this risk. Banks with abundant liquidity at their disposal were 
in a position to grant loans to foreign entities (mainly non-resident banks) while 
also being able to mitigate their own risks as well as lending costs. In syndicated 
lending a single bank (administrative agent) is designated to pool the funds and 
carry out the administrative tasks associated with the loan. Accordingly, the lending 
costs and lending risks are shared by a syndicate of lenders; moreover, smaller 
creditors for whom such lending was previously out of reach on their own may also 
join the syndicate. Repayment risk could be reduced even further if the country of 
the syndicate’s administrative agent had close economic ties with the borrower’s 
country, because this diminished the political risk associated with the repayment. 
Not only creditors but also borrowers enjoyed the benefits of syndicated loans, 
given that the level of lending costs was no longer determined by a single creditor 
(Gadanecz 2004; Altunbas et al. 2006; Gyntelberg – Wooldridge 2008; Ridley – 
Jones 2012).
Since syndicated lending was popular both among creditors and borrowers, both 
the market and the volume of syndicated loans grew dynamically (Altunbas et al. 
2006), which deepened the relationships between the banks involved in syndicated 
lending.
The pricing structure of syndicated loans largely comprised three types of 
component. There were “permanent” fees, such as legal and administration costs, 
the creditor’s funding costs, and a “spread” for profit (Gadanecz 2004; Ridley – 
Jones 2012).
In practice, in full awareness of the permanent fees of the agent bank, shortly before 
the lending transaction the creditors indicated their lending intention and their 
funding costs for the given transaction to the agent bank. The volume-weighted 
average of these costs plus the profit (spread) on the weighted average became the 
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price (interest level) of the syndicated loan. In fact, it was the weighted average of 
the funding costs of banks participating in syndicated lending that was first called 
the London Interbank Offer Rate, or LIBOR.
Due to the weighted average there was initially no incentive to underreport the 
fixing rate because any bank that submitted unreasonably low funding costs could 
have done so only to the detriment of the others, and was therefore ejected from 
the syndicate (Ridley – Jones 2012). There was no cap on the interest rate level (or 
more precisely, only market demand could put a limit on the rates). The interest 
rates were renegotiated every three or six months.
In 1986 the British Bank Association took control of the LIBOR calculation and 
renamed the rate BBALibor (British Bank Association London Interbank Offered 
Rate). The goal was to formalise the process of collecting interbank rates and to 
boost efficiency, transparency and governance (Ridley – Jones 2012). It was this 
process that made LIBOR a publicly available and widely used benchmark. 
2.2. Appearance of manipulation incentives
Parallel to the rise in syndicated lending, banks were also keen on investing the 
largest possible portion of their own assets in the same way because the profits 
achievable through syndicated lending were higher than what could have been 
obtained by lending the same amount in their own country in accordance with 
the relevant (income-limiting) domestic regulations, at full risk costs and lending 
costs. In other words, the return on equity was maximised, which is understandable 
or necessary in the case of profit-oriented organisations. Banks’ operating costs 
were increasingly financed from cheap external (mainly domestic) funds. This led 
to a situation where, thanks to the abundant liquidity, banks operated on cheap 
domestic funds while they realised higher than ever returns on equity through 
syndicated loans granted to foreign borrowers. Of course, the demand created by 
the export market of syndicated loans was far higher than the banks’ capacity to 
supply. This increased the popularity of syndicated lending even further, since its 
profitability was able to remain high and stable. As banks increasingly borrowed 
their own funding from external sources, they had a growing interest in keeping 
their cost of funds at low levels. Ultimately, this process provided the incentive to 
push LIBOR rates as low as possible (Ridley – Jones 2012). 
The innovation of financial products provided another impetus to the manipulation 
incentives. By the end of the 1970s the global economy had been through two oil 
crises and the gold standard system was long since consigned to the past as well. 
Accordingly, risks had also changed at the international level: the surge in oil prices 
gave rise to inflation which, in turn, raised interest rate and exchange rate risks to 
previously unseen levels. Interest Rate Swaps (IRS) and Forward Rate Agreements 
(FRA) were specifically developed with a view to mitigating these risks. 
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Trading in IRS began in 1981, while the first FRA contract was concluded in 1983 
(Kuprianov 1993; Farkas et al. 2004; Gyntelberg – Wooldridge 2008). Floating 
rates play an important role in both transactions; they determine whether 
a transaction is settled with a gain or a loss for the investor. Initially, floating rates 
were represented by various indices, which were gradually replaced by LIBOR after 
it officially commenced in 1986. As a result, on the one hand LIBOR practically 
became the most important benchmark rate, while on the other hand key IRS and 
FRA trading days created a new incentive to manipulate the interest rates1. In all 
fairness, it should be noted that a number of other important financial benchmarks 
co-existed with LIBOR; however, LIBOR’s status as the most recognised and most 
widely accepted rate was unquestionable.
Last but not least, it should be mentioned that the pricing of an increasing number 
of products was – and still is – linked to interbank rates in view of the interest 
rate risk involved (e.g. the interest level of mortgage loans or corporate credit) 
which, similar to the derivative transactions referred to above implies additional 
manipulation incentives with respect to the interbank rates (and thus LIBOR).
2.3. Manipulation of LIBOR and the counter-measures taken – the regulatory 
environment
Interbank benchmark rates came under the scrutiny of regulatory authorities for the 
first time in 2007 in relation to the manipulation scandal unfolding around LIBOR. 
It was in that year that Barclays alerted the US money market supervision that 
certain banks may be manipulating the value of the London Interbank Offered Rate 
LIBOR (Cutler – Ridley 2013). In order to rig the LIBOR rate, some banks submitted 
dishonestly low interbank rates. At the global level, however, the scandal erupted 
only in 2008 in the wake of a revelatory article published in The Wall Street Journal 
(Mollencamp 2008). The investigations launched in response to the LIBOR scandal 
found that the manipulation of LIBOR went all the way back to 1991 – since that 
year the 11 banks named in the conspiracy had manipulated the value of LIBOR on 
a regular basis (Fliszár 2016; Cutler – Ridley 2013; Mollencamp 2008).
In an effort to clamp down on manipulation, in July 2013 the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions (hereinafter: IOSCO) issued its 
recommendations on financial reference rates (also known as financial benchmarks) 
(IOSCO 2013). IOSCO defined a set of recommended practices primarily for 
benchmark administrators but indirectly, the recommendations also affect the 
institutions submitting the fixings for the benchmark. The 19 recommendations 
essentially target the following three areas:
1  The days on which traders settle the deal at the prevailing interest rate level.
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1.  Integrity of the data used for constructing the benchmarks should be protected.
2.  Adequacy and transparency of the methodology used to make benchmark 
determinations should be ensured.
3.  Conflicts of interest should be identified and eliminated and appropriate controls 
applied.
All three objectives are intended to ensure (restore) the reliability of financial 
benchmarks. 
In the European Union, the requirements of benchmark determination were laid 
down by law on 8 June 2016 when the so-called Benchmark Regulation2 (hereinafter: 
BMR) entered into force. The provisions of the BMR are directly applicable to both 
administrators – institutions responsible for calculating the reference rate – and 
contributors – institutions reporting their rates – in all Member States of the 
European Union.
3. Methods for preventing and detecting manipulation of interbank 
benchmark rate submissions
The BMR Regulation sets out numerous provisions that are intended to ensure the 
reliability of interbank reference rate submissions while curbing the incentives for 
their manipulation. One such provision, for example, is the requirement for the 
contributor to keep and preserve retrievable records of all external and internal 
communications of the persons participating in the fixing process (the contributors 
and the endorsers of reference rates). At the same time, no matter how strict 
the legislative provisions, they will never fully guarantee that the submissions 
are free of manipulation; they merely raise the potential costs of the intention to 
manipulate. For example, the recording of an institution’s official communications 
may be circumvented by phone conversations on an employee’s personal phone or 
by informal discussions in lunch breaks. Since controls involve costs which should 
be kept at a reasonable level, the preferred methods should be those that are likely 
to prevent manipulation or signal suspected manipulations of the benchmark rate. 
By doing so we can avoid the creation of unnecessarily long lines of defence.
However, it should be pointed out at the start that any method described below – 
irrespective of whether it was adapted from literature or reflects the author’s own 
thoughts – is only suitable for signalling suspected manipulations or reducing the 
probability of manipulation occurring, as changes in the value of the reference rate 
2  Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on indices used as 
benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment 
funds and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014.
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may be – and are – influenced by the liquidity positions, strategic objectives and 
applied monetary policy instruments of the banks participating in the submission 
process of interbank benchmark rates (Gereben 2000).
The methods below are presented irrespective of whether they are applied by the 
administrator, the contributor or the external auditor. 
3.1. Definition of manipulation potential
In their study, Eisl et al. (2017) examined the manipulation potential of interbank 
benchmark rates in such a way that they set the lowest LIBOR fixing rate of the 
current day equal to the highest observed fixing rate. With this scenario the 
authors attempted to simulate how much a single bank could move the value of 
the benchmark rate if it intended to manipulate it. The value of the manipulation 
potential was derived as the difference between the value of the original LIBOR and 
that of the modified LIBOR. In the context of this study the model constructed by 
Eisl et al. (2017) was adapted and applied under a number of different scenarios. 
3.2. Trimmed mean (trimming procedure)
The LIBOR value was initially computed as the weighted average of the cost of funds 
of participants in the lending syndicate and the sizes of loans granted by them. After 
the first official publication of LIBOR in 1986, the weighting no longer had a base; 
consequently, it was removed from the methodology and the interbank rate was 
ultimately calculated as the arithmetic mean of the submissions. However, the 
drawback of the simple arithmetic mean method is that it is extremely sensitive to 
outliers. In practice, this means that even a single bank can alter the value of the 
interbank benchmark rate potentially significantly. 
The trimming procedure is designed to eliminate this possibility. Essentially, this 
method means that in order to prevent outliers from skewing the mean excessively, 
the highest and lowest submissions (or a certain percentage thereof) are discarded 
from the calculation of the mean, and the resulting mean will be the final value of 
the official interbank benchmark rate.
In their study, Eisl et al. (2017) tested the efficiency of the trimmed mean. They 
sought to measure the extent to which underreporting (where the bank’s submitted 
fixing is below the mean, i.e. the interbank offered rate) can move the value of 
the interbank rate. They demonstrated that the trimming procedure significantly 
improves the reliability of the benchmark rate, yet despite using a trimmed mean, 
manipulation by even a single bank could result in a shift in the interbank reference 
rate which, according to the authors’ calculations, may amount to 0.48 basis points 
in the case of the 3-month USD LIBOR and 0.17 basis points in the case of the 
3-month EURIBOR. This value grew progressively where several panel banks acted 
in concert to modify the submissions. The authors found that increasing the number 
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of contributors reduced the manipulation potential substantially. The study by Choy 
et al. (2012) confirms these findings: even a single bank can influence the reference 
rate despite the trimming procedure.
From an audit perspective, one key finding of Eisl et al. (2017) is that given the 
volatile nature of individual banks’ submissions – underreported and overreported 
rates – detecting manipulation immediately is close to impossible. 
3.3. Median fixing
In the course of median fixing, contributors (banks) submit the required data 
(fixings) to the administrator. The administrator institution puts the fixings in 
ascending order. The reference rate, in this case, will be the median of the submitted 
rates; i.e. the one that divides the data arranged in ascending order into two equal 
parts (with an even number of contributor banks, the value of the reference rate 
will be the simple arithmetic mean of the two fixings in the middle).
The analysis by Eisl et al. (2017) demonstrated that the median method reduces 
the potential for manipulation to a minimum (to one third compared to the value 
received for the trimmed mean method). 
3.4. Dynamic extreme value analysis
The dynamic extreme value analysis examines the absolute difference between 
current day fixing submissions and fixing submissions on the previous day. The 
fixing submissions of the contributors with the highest absolute change (either in 
a positive or negative direction) compared to the previous day are discarded from 
the calculation of the reference rate. In this respect, the reference rate computed 
on the basis of the dynamic extreme value corresponds to a kind of trimmed mean. 
One potential benefit of the method is its ability to screen for one-off effects 
whereby the value of the reference rate will flatten out across individual days. 
Such a one-off effect can be a data error or even an exceptional liquidity position 
of the contributing institution.
Under the dynamic extreme value analysis approach, a reporting agent can only 
manipulate if it keeps its submissions continuously within a value range that could 
be acceptable for it on a given day. In this case, however, the probability of being 
caught (in other words, the transaction cost of the manipulation) increases.
3.5. Analysis of the pricing of correlating products
According to Monticini – Thornton (2013), if the interbank reference rate is 
manipulated, there will be a positive or negative difference between the benchmark 
rate and the pricing of a product with a correlating return. In their paper, the authors 
explore the correlation between LIBOR and the yield on Certificates of Deposit 
41
Integrity of Financial Benchmarks
(CDs). Based on their hypothesis, there is a near-identical difference between LIBOR 
and CD rates over time (expressed in basis points); in other words, the correlation 
between the two points to a fairly constant difference (spread) that has a constant 
standard deviation. A marked change in the spread between LIBOR rates and CD 
rates (a mean value computed from the time series of the LIBOR – CD spreads) may 
signal a manipulation of the reference rate. Processing data for the period between 
2004 and 2010, the authors found evidence that the spread between LIBOR rates 
and CD rates increased in the case of misreporting, and that after the manipulation 
the LIBOR – CD spreads eventually returned to their pre-underreporting levels. 
Brousseau et al. (2009) came to a similar conclusion in relation to the Overnight 
Index Swap (OIS) and LIBOR.
The method is suitable for ex-post audits, and an active market for the correlating 
product is an important prerequisite for its application. 
3.6. Outlier analysis
The outlier analysis may be used to examine two aspects: firstly, the change in 
contributors’ fixing submissions relative to their previous fixing submissions, and 
secondly, changes in the fixing submissions relative to the benchmark rate. When 
the difference between the current day fixing submission and the base date fixing 
submission exceeds a certain level, manipulation or error can be suspected in both 
cases, and the value of the current day fixing submission should be inspected.
The difference that triggers such an action once it has been exceeded can be defined 
using a number of approaches. The first and perhaps simplest procedure is to set 
a pre-defined time horizon which will be considered for the calculation of the 
standard deviation (with respect to the calculation of the standard deviation of 
an institution’s own submissions and that of the benchmark rate). If the absolute 
value of the current day difference exceeds the standard deviation or twice the 
value of the standard deviation, the current day submission should be considered 
an outlier. Accordingly, the standard deviation should be defined every day for an 
identical horizon (lookback period), and the value of the current day submission 
should be compared to that.
A less dynamic solution is to define the standard deviation based on a longer time 
series (e.g. 10 years). The advantage of this method is the likelihood of having both 
stressed and unstressed periods, as well as low and high interest environments in 
the calculation. For longer time series, in view of the higher standard deviation 
value, the size of the change should be compared to only a fraction of the deviation.
It is a somewhat more sophisticated method to define the percentage of the 
submissions that should be brought under scrutiny. In that case, the change in the 
value of a fixing can be determined based on historic data in such a way that a pre-
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defined percentage of the cases (the percentage that should be inspected) falls 
within the range. Despite its sophistication, the disadvantage of the latter method 
is its reduced ability to signal potential manipulation because it may also include 
cases where the change between the submissions of the two days is insignificant.
A common trait of these methods is their need to select the lookback period – 
the period to be considered for the purposes of the calculations – appropriately. 
Therefore the models presented here need to be calibrated before application.
3.7. Analysis of fixing dynamics
The analysis of fixing dynamics examines the rate at which an individual contributor 
submitted a rate which eventually ended up above or below the current day value 
of the benchmark. The differences between fixing contributing banks may result 
in the emergence of typically ‘underreporting’ or ‘overreporting’ banks. Obviously, 
this does not mean that this is always the case over the short term, so analysing 
fixing dynamics may be useful to identify signs of manipulation based on certain 
patterns. While this method is less objective in this regard, applying it together with 
other methodologies may be an efficient tool in signalling potential manipulation 
or confirming suspected manipulation. In addition, an analysis of fixing dynamics 
provides information about the liquidity of the contributors and about the extent 
to which liquidity is concentrated in the market.
3.8. Analysis of trading days that impact asset pricing
The greatest risk associated with misreporting the benchmark interbank rate arises 
with respect to the key dates on which derivative transactions are settled if an 
employee of the contributing institution is simultaneously authorised to conclude 
derivative contracts, because this allows the trader to influence the outcome 
(profitability) of his deals through the fixing submission. The manipulation risk 
associated with the trader involved in the derivative transaction is reduced if the 
counterparty in the given transaction is also a contributor in the fixing procedure 
of the benchmark rate, given that it will have a conflicting interest. However, the 
risk is exacerbated if traders who also act as contributors conclude a contract with 
a party who does not submit fixing rates.
In addition to the above, the days on which assets are substantially repriced at the 
contributing bank based on the interbank offered rate also carry risk in an indirect 
way. Such a case, for example, can be when the interest rate on the bank’s (or all 
banks’) housing loan or corporate loan portfolio is repriced on the same day (e.g. 
the 2nd working day preceding the end of the month3).
3  Pursuant to Section 17/D (1) of Act CLXII of 2009 (“Fair Bank Act”), where loan contracts are tied to reference 
interest rates, the reference rate shall be adjusted at intervals aligned with the tenor of the reference rate 
defined in the loan contract to the reference rate effective 2 days before the last working day of the month 
preceding the anniversary date.
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Based on the above, the essence of the method is to inspect the fixing submissions 
of the days that coincide with the settlement day of derivative transactions or with 
the days of large-scale asset repricing actions.
It should be noted and stressed emphatically that the mere fact a bank ‘overreports’ 
or ‘underreports’ the fixing on such key dates does not automatically mean that 
it is trying to rig the rate, because submissions are also influenced by market 
specificities, a bank’s liquidity position and current monetary policy instruments. 
With that in mind, fixing submissions on such key dates should always be examined 
ex-post, on a time series basis and focusing on their trends.
Apart from the above, we refrain from discussing this method in further detail in 
this study as the data required to apply it, are not publicly available. 
3.9. Cluster analysis
Choy et al. (2012) examined whether applying a multivariate statistical approach can 
be used to detect manipulation and collusion between banks. With a hierarchical 
cluster analysis on LIBOR submission data between 2005 and 2012 they successfully 
detected the cases where a bank’s submissions differed excessively from those of 
the others (i.e. it misreported its funding costs). In the authors’ view, the method 
may be suitable for identifying well-concerted interbank collusions. Indeed, in the 
case of concerted manipulation, the cluster analysis classifies colluding banks into 
the same group. The co-authors also warn not to draw definitive conclusions from 
the dendrogram (grouping) that illustrates the results of the cluster analysis, even 
though it is suitable for pointing towards potential manipulation. This is consistent 
with the wording of Sajtos – Mitev (2007), who indicated that cluster analysis is 
primarily an exploratory technique.
In practice, grouping with a cluster analysis should be performed based on two or 
more different distance and similarity measures. If two contributors display similar 
submissions consistently, the two different techniques will yield nearly identical 
results. Since collusion (manipulation) may be suspected in this case, further 
investigation is required.
One drawback of the methodology is that its applicability is limited to complete time 
series. Consequently, if a contributing bank appears or disappears within the review 
period (in other words, there is no full time series for the institution concerned), 
it needs to be excluded from the analysis. Moreover, the method is sensitive to 
outliers, which means that some procedure needs to be applied to address the 
outliers before the analysis.
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3.10. Payment system operators as benchmark rate administrators
Defining the benchmark rate through the payment system is a new approach. 
Assuming that interbank rates are calculated on the basis of unsecured interbank 
loans, actual transactions executed via high-value payment systems provide the 
information required for setting the benchmark rate; consequently, the payment 
system operator can play the role of the benchmark rate administrator. In the case 
of the European Central Bank, the Euro Short-Term Rate (ESTER) – which is based 
on the high-value TARGET2 payment system – serves as such a reference rate (ECB 
2018). A slightly different approach was proposed in the United States by Frost 
(2017) in relation to the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR). The difference 
is that Frost proposes to obtain the data required to produce the benchmark rate 
from a data repository rather than through the payment system. 
In this context, the manipulation incentive will be eliminated on the bank side as the 
interbank offered rate is determined on the basis of actual transaction data. From 
a social optimum perspective, this could also reduce the resources expended by 
market participants and supervisory authorities to verify the integrity and market 
conformity of the submissions.
4. BUBOR
In this chapter, we present the methods discussed in detail in the previous chapter 
through the example of the Budapest Interbank Offered Rate (BUBOR), limiting the 
methods to those where sufficient data were publicly available.
4.1. Tenors under review
At the time the study was prepared, in its capacity as the administrator of BUBOR, 
the MNB published official BUBOR rates for nine tenors (maturities): overnight4, 
1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, 6 months, 9 months and 1 year. 
Due to the limited scope of this study, we only address overnight fixings below; but 
the methodologies applied can be used for all tenors, including the 3 and 6-month 
tenors5.
4.2. Period under review
The BUBOR time series was available – through REUTERS – from January 2014 
to 15 August 2018 at the time this study was written; so this entire period was 
processed. Two periods should be examined separately within the review period 
because, given the near-zero interest environment, the standard deviation of BUBOR 
fixings decreased sharply compared to the preceding period from the beginning of 
4  O/N
5  In their study, Kocsis et al. (2013) demonstrated that the 3 and 6-month tenors play an important role in 
the interest rate derivative market.
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2017. The review period is therefore split into a pre-2017 and a post-2017 period 
(Figure 1).
4.3. Mean, median, trimmed mean and trimmed median fixings
Based on Eisl et al. (2017), we sought to explore the manipulation potential of the 
interbank offered rate in the case of overnight unsecured interbank offered rate 
submissions as well. At the same time, however, in addition to ‘underreporting’, we 
also included the ‘overreporting’ potential in the analytical framework. Accordingly, 
the ‘underreporting’ and ‘overreporting’ potential was established for the two 
distinct periods, each comprising 6 scenarios as follows:
•  collusion of three banks for overreporting;
•  collusion of two banks for overreporting;
•  overreporting by one bank;
•  underreporting by one bank;
•  collusion of two banks for underreporting;
•  collusion of three banks for underreporting;
Figure 1
O/N BUBOR fixings (individual panel bank submissions) 
(January 2014 – August 2018)
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The mean, median, trimmed median and trimmed median values of the 
submissions were calculated under each scenario. Trimming was performed 
in accordance with the BUBOR Regulation in effect since 1 January 2018 (MNB 
2018). Based on the calculations, the less the manipulation altered the originally 
computed result on average, the better the given method performed. Table 1 
summarises the results.
Table 1
Manipulation potential of O/N BUBOR according to methods applied
BUBOR O/N 
manipulation 
potential
High volatility of fixing submissions Low volatility of fixing submissions
Difference 
(bp)
Name of method Difference 
(bp)
Name of method
min max best worst min max best worst
Overreporting 
(3 banks)
–9.64 –12.70
Trimmed 
median
Mean –0.02 –2.06 Mean
Trimmed 
median
Overreporting 
(2 banks)
–5.46 –10.09
Trimmed 
median
Mean –0.01 –1.21 Mean
Trimmed 
median
Overreporting 
(1 bank)
–0.92 –7.28
Trimmed 
mean
Mean –0.01 –0.63 Mean
Trimmed 
median
Underreporting 
(1 bank)
1.19 7.28
Trimmed 
median
Mean 0.01 0.45 Mean
Trimmed 
mean
Underreporting 
(2 banks)
10.08 13.77
Trimmed 
median
Trimmed 
mean
0.02 1.11 Mean
Trimmed 
mean
Underreporting 
(3 banks)
18.16 25.27 Mean
Trimmed 
mean
0.02 2.02 Mean
Trimmed 
median
According to Table 1, when fixing submission volatility is low the smallest 
manipulation potential is produced by the arithmetic mean method, whereas the 
greatest manipulation potential is produced by the trimmed median and trimmed 
mean procedures. By contrast, with high fixing submission volatility the trimmed 
median method appears to be the most reliable (smallest manipulation potential) 
and the arithmetic mean method proved to be the worst (greatest manipulation 
potential). Supplementing the results of Eisl et al. (2017) we found that this 
manipulation potential increased in volatile periods (where the standard deviation 
of the fixings increased) and decreased in less volatile periods.
The values shown in the table also indicate that in the context of low fixing 
submission volatility, the ‘underreporting’ and ‘overreporting’ potential is nearly 
identical in all scenarios, whereas the ‘underreporting’ potential is higher in periods 
of high fixing submission volatility. This can be attributed to a number of reasons. 
The liquidity position of the panel banks (contributors) is at play as a factor, but the 
contributors’ respective strategies should also be considered. For example, an 
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institution does not always wish to place its liquidity in the unsecured interbank 
market – in this case it will ‘overreport’, and according to the methodology used to 
measure the manipulation potential, BUBOR’s value will shift downwards more 
sharply. A summary of the manipulation potentials calculated for each scenario 
under review clearly shows that the underreporting manipulation potential is 
stronger (Figure 2).
Last but not least, there is evidence that median-based fixing is more likely to reduce 
the manipulation potential when the trimming procedure leaves a greater number of 
bank submissions in the calculation basket. There is no exact number to show how 
many institutions should submit rates in order to reduce the manipulation potential 
to the minimum under median-based submissions. At the same time, with the median 
calculation methodology it is expedient to have a selection basis include at least 
three banks’ submissions after the trimming procedure, which means that lined up 
in ascending order, the value in the middle would be the value of the benchmark.
4.4. Dynamic extreme value analysis
Since the dynamic extreme value analysis corresponds to a trimming procedure in 
itself, in this case only two methods were scrutinised: the dynamic mean and the 
dynamic median. 
Figure 2
Manipulation potential of O/N BUBOR submissions in function of the standard 
deviation of the fixing submissions in each scenario under review
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Table 2
Manipulation potential of O/N BUBOR according to the methods applied
BUBOR O/N 
manipulation 
potential
High volatility of fixing submissions Low volatility of fixing submissions
Difference 
(bp)
Name of method Difference 
(bp)
Name of method
min max best worst min max best worst
Overreporting 
(3 banks)
–21.25 –24.62 Dynamic 
mean
Dynamic 
median
–0.02 –2.18 Dynamic 
mean
Dynamic 
median
Overreporting 
(2 banks)
–16.96 –19.89 Dynamic 
mean
Dynamic 
median
–0.02 –1.32 Dynamic 
mean
Dynamic 
median
Overreporting 
(1 bank)
–9.97 –10.27 Dynamic 
median
Dynamic 
mean
–0.01 –0.56 Dynamic 
mean
Dynamic 
median
Underreporting 
(1 bank)
10.09 10.26 Dynamic 
mean
Dynamic 
median
0.01 0.59 Dynamic 
mean
Dynamic 
median
Underreporting 
(2 banks)
17.63 21.72 Dynamic 
mean
Dynamic 
median
0.02 1.73 Dynamic 
mean
Dynamic 
median
Underreporting 
(3 banks)
22.69 28.47 Dynamic 
mean
Dynamic 
median
0.02 3.19 Dynamic 
mean
Dynamic 
median
Table 2 indicates the manipulation potential of O/N BUBOR values produced by 
the dynamic extreme value analysis. We found that the dynamic extreme value 
analysis carries a higher manipulation potential when the standard deviation of the 
submissions is higher. It should be added, however, that applying the dynamic mean 
approach carries lower manipulation potential than the trimmed mean method 
currently used, when the standard deviation of the submissions is low. 
4.5. Analysis of pricing of correlating products
Horváth – Makay (2015) found that BUBOR did not present any additional 
information compared to the base rate. Moreover, consistent with the conclusions 
of Csizmadia (2014), Horváth – Makay (2015) concluded that all alternative 
benchmarks (with which BUBOR could correlate) either had some kind of 
methodological deficiency (e.g. FRA rates6) or they had no active market (e.g. CDs). 
As a result, applying this method to detect potential BUBOR manipulations would be 
subject to strong constraints. Moreover, the effects of one-off market phenomena 
and monetary policy instruments should also be considered in each case, which is 
beyond the scope and purpose of this study.
6  They present market expectations but do not reflect credit risk.
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4.6. Outlier analysis
In the framework of the outlier analysis we compared the difference between 
contributors’ current day and base day fixing submissions to the standard deviation 
of their own submissions for the past 250 fixing days and to double its value on 
the one hand, and to the similarly computed standard deviation of BUBOR as well 
as double its value (standard deviation with a 250-day lookback period) on the 
other. If the difference between the current day and base day exceeds the standard 
deviation or double its value (selected at one’s discretion), there is a suspicion of 
manipulation and the current day fixing procedure should be inspected at institution 
level. The results of the outlier analysis are displayed in Table 3 and Table 4.
Table 3
Number of cases to be inspected at panel bank level according to outlier analysis 
between 2015 and 2018 
(1 standard deviation)
Change is 
greater 
than 1 
standard 
deviation
Change is greater than standard deviation 
of own fixing submissions
Change is greater than standard deviation 
of BUBOR
2018 2017 2016 2015 2018 2017 2016 2015
Bank 12 1 0 11 43 8 0 11 42
Bank 14 5 4 12 43 6 4 12 41
Bank 6 7 3 16 36 22 4 16 39
Bank 1 5 2 0 0 15 6 0 0
Bank 3 3 0 11 34 3 0 10 37
Bank 13 12 3 0 0 18 7 0 0
Bank 7 2 3 8 31 2 4 8 31
Bank 10 6 4 16 37 5 7 17 39
Bank 5 0 0 12 41 0 0 12 41
Bank 11 4 3 11 43 10 4 11 43
Bank 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank 2 7 2 15 27 8 3 15 33
Total: 52 24 112 335 97 39 112 346
Note: The complete time series was only available for the BUBOR quoting institutions shaded in dark-
grey.
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Table 4
Number of cases to be inspected at panel bank level according to outlier analysis 
between 2015 and 2018 
(2 standard deviations)
Change is 
greater 
than 2 
standard 
deviations
Change is greater than standard deviation 
of own fixing submissions
Change is greater than standard deviation 
of BUBOR
2018 2017 2016 2015 2018 2017 2016 2015
Bank 12 0 0 1 14 0 0 1 13
Bank 14 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 7
Bank 6 1 0 2 8 5 1 2 14
Bank 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0
Bank 3 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 11
Bank 13 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
Bank 7 0 2 2 10 0 2 2 9
Bank 10 0 2 3 10 0 4 3 11
Bank 5 0 0 1 10 0 0 1 9
Bank 11 0 0 1 8 2 0 1 8
Bank 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank 2 4 0 1 8 4 0 1 11
Total: 9 4 12 84 19 9 12 93
Note: The complete time series was only available for the BUBOR quoting institutions shaded in dark-
grey.
In a yearly breakdown, Tables 3 and 4 provide a summary of the number of 
cases when individual contributors should have inspected the current day fixing 
procedure; i.e. the number of cases where manipulation could have been suspected 
based on the methodology. 
With regard to this method, it is important to emphasise that the lookback period 
applied fundamentally influences the number of suspected manipulations, so the 
results should always be evaluated with that in mind. The 250-day lookback period 
applied in this article is a generally accepted horizon in risk management. Moreover, 
as is the case with the rest of the methods, this method only gives rise to the 
suspicion of manipulation and it is unsuitable in itself to serve as evidence.
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4.7. Analysis of fixing dynamics
Compared to the methods presented above, the analysis of fixing dynamics is less 
objective as in the case of BUBOR it is more likely to reflect the liquidity position 
or risk management practice of the panel bank (contributor) rather than anomalies 
in the fixing procedure itself. The longer the horizon, the more stable the view we 
get regarding the individual banks. It is clearly shown on Figure 3 which banks 
tended to ‘overreport’ and which institutions were more likely to ‘underreport’ the 
fixing in the period between 2014 and 2018.
To detect suspected manipulation through the analysis of fixing dynamics, the long-
run trend should be compared with an institution’s behaviour in a selected period. 
When there is a marked difference between the short-term behaviour and the 
long-term trend, the period should be scrutinised with respect to manipulation. It 
is important to ensure that the shorter period reflects at least a one-month – or 
better still, quarterly – fixing practice, as a period shorter than this is likely to yield 
a marked difference. As is the case with the rest of the methods, this method in 
itself can only indicate a suspicion of manipulation. Considering that the result of 
the method is also influenced by other factors (e.g. an enduring change in liquidity 
position), it should therefore primarily be used as a double-checking method (when 
another method has already pointed to potential manipulation). 
Figure 3
Fixing dynamics of O/N BUBOR contributors between 2014 and 2018
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4.8. Cluster analysis
Concerted fixing submissions were examined by way of a cluster analysis, relying 
on two methods (nearest neighbour and Ward procedures). In examining such 
collusions, it is once again important to select the appropriate period. If the period 
selected is too long, the result will be less likely to capture any suspected collusions 
because other characteristics of the contributor will also be reflected indirectly (e.g. 
household/corporate profile). In other words, the cluster analysis should be focused 
on behaviour over a shorter horizon (less than 1 year but not less than a quarter7).
For the purposes of this study, O/N BUBOR submissions in 20188 were compared 
at each individual institution where a time series for the entire period of January 
2018 – August 2018 was available. 
Collusion may be suspected if the submissions by two or more contributors are 
consistently the same when a method using various distance and similarity measures 
is applied. Simply, the method puts them into the same group, irrespective of the 
method applied. The resulting dendrograms are displayed on Figure 4 and Figure 5.
7  Cluster analyses may only be conducted with a sufficient number of submissions.
8  From 1 January 2018 to 15 August 2018
Figure 4
Cluster analysis (nearest neighbour)
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As the dendrograms indicate, the submissions of some institutions are identical 
according to both methods (Bank 10 and Bank 14, as well as Bank 3 and Bank 7); 
consequently, manipulation should be suspected in their case. Applying the fixing 
dynamics analysis for the same period – to double check – partly confirms the result 
of the cluster analysis, with Bank 10 and Bank 14 ‘overreporting’ at a nearly identical 
rate (see Figure 6). In the case of Bank 7 and Bank 3, however, the correlation is 
not that clear: apparently, Bank 7 was far more likely to have fixing submissions 
consistent with the mean than Bank 3.
Figure 5
Cluster analysis (Ward) 
(Jan – Aug 2018)
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Considering the low interest environment and excess liquidity that characterised the 
market throughout the review period, and the low standard deviation of the fixing 
submissions (partly due to the former factors), the suspected manipulation cannot 
be confirmed even in the case of Bank 10 and Bank 14. Based on the methodology 
applied by the central bank, the manipulation potential of the benchmark rate 
would not be significant in quantitative terms even in the case of collusion between 
two banks (Table 5). 
Table 5
Manipulation potential under trimmed mean and low fixing volatility
Trimmed mean Manipulation potential (basis points)
Underreporting manipulation (3 banks) 2.02
Underreporting manipulation (2 banks) 0.94
Underreporting manipulation (1 bank) 0.38
Overreporting manipulation (1 bank) –0.63
Overreporting manipulation (2 banks) –1.21
Overreporting manipulation (3 banks) –2.06
Figure 6
Fixing dynamics of O/N BUBOR contributors in 2018
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Based on the above we may conclude that the cluster analysis of co-submissions 
may be a more efficient tool if the fixing submissions underlying the benchmark 
rate had a higher – rather than a lower – standard deviation. In any event, also 
in view of the manipulation potential pertaining to the review period, we found 
evidence – as mentioned before – that this method, like the others, is not suitable 
in itself to confirm suspected manipulation. 
5. Conclusions
To reduce the manipulation risk of interbank rates used as financial benchmarks 
to a minimum level, it is indispensable to understand the historic processes that 
shaped the emergence and development of reference rates. In this regard, it was 
Fliszár (2016) who captured the main difference between the calculation of the 
scandal-ridden LIBOR and that of BUBOR. As pointed out by the author, before the 
eruption of the LIBOR scandal the data underlying the LIBOR calculation were based 
on the self-assessments of the reporting institutions and in theory, the submissions 
reflected the cost of funds of the institutions concerned. By contrast, in the case 
of BUBOR the data reflected the cost of funds at which banks would be willing to 
grant unsecured loans to each other. Put simply, one rate was based on self-rating, 
while the other rated the market. In this regard, the incentive for manipulation is 
far higher in the case of self-assessment, whereas in the other case, the rating of 
partner institutions’ market or partner risk also functioned as a significant counter-
incentive for manipulation.
It is also important to be aware of the extent to which a benchmark rate is exposed 
to a potential manipulation attempt. For BUBOR, this was examined for two 
different periods under 6 scenarios in each period. At a low level of fixing submission 
volatility, the results indicated that even with the collusion of 3 banks and applying 
the worst method (dynamic mean) the manipulation potential was far below 4 basis 
points. The corresponding value calculated with the best method (arithmetic mean) 
was 0.01 bps. With high fixing submission volatility, a manipulation potential of 
28.47 bps was yielded by the worst method (dynamic median) assuming a collusion 
of 3 banks, while the best method (trimmed median) produced a corresponding 
value of as low as 9.64 bps. It is also important to stress that BUBOR is far more 
likely to be ‘underreported’ than ‘overreported’. As regards the methods applied, 
the simple arithmetic mean performed the best under low fixing submission 
volatility, while under high submission volatility the trimmed median and trimmed 
mean methods were the best.
Considering that manipulations of the financial benchmark cannot be detected 
immediately (as they occur) under reasonable audit costs, priority should be given 
to methods which reduce the manipulation potential on the one hand, and increase 
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the likelihood of detecting manipulation on the other hand. Table 6 presents the 
methods applied in this article and their possible areas of implementation with 
respect to the data available.
Table 6
Methods that may be used to prevent and detect fixing manipulations, by possible 
area of institutional implementation
Name of method Administrator Data provider 
(contributor)
Supervision
Mean, median, trimmed mean and 
trimmed median fixings
X X
Dynamic extreme value analysis X X
Analysis of pricing of correlating products X X
Outlier analysis X X X
Analysis of fixing dynamics X X X
Analysis of trading days that impact asset 
pricing
X X
Cluster analysis X X X
The table does not include determining the benchmark rate based on payment 
system data. This is because operators of high-value payment systems may appear 
in several different roles (e.g. administrator, central bank, supervision, etc.).
The methods applied in constructing the benchmark rate reduce the manipulation 
potential, while the methods that can be implemented at the institutional and 
supervisory level increase the likelihood of detecting manipulations.
Overall, we can state that the low interest rate environment and the low standard 
deviation of the fixings combined with the applied methodology essentially reduced 
the manipulation potential to a near-zero level. This also means that when fixing 
submission volatility is low, it is justified and substantiated to reduce the resources 
deployed on supervising and auditing the process of producing reference rates.
Last but not least, it should be noted that introducing specific methods may prompt 
an adjustment on the part of the contributors, which may weaken or strengthen 
the efficiency of the method concerned. 
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